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THE MYSTERY OF THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OLEKSANDR MEREZHKO* 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of sovereignty and the concept of state are two fundamental 
pillars upon which the entire architecture of contemporary international law, 
including its theories and practices, rests.1 Without these two concepts there 
would be no international law at all, for the core of it is the law between 
sovereign states, which has been created by the states for themselves.2 To put it 
simply, international law is primarily inter-states law, in which a state is viewed 
as a sovereign geopolitical entity.3 
And, yet, both concepts—that of sovereignty and state—present an 
unsurmountable difficulty and challenge to the contemporary theory of 
international law, which seems unable to formulate coherent and logically 
consistent scientific definitions of state and sovereignty. As Professor James 
Crawford acknowledges: “Despite its importance, statehood ‘in the sense of 
international law’ has not always been a clearly defined concept.”4 Even the 
International Law Commission, while drafting the Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of States, was not able to reach an agreement on the definition of “state.”5 
Professor Crawford himself in his voluminous work devoted to statehood in 
international law seems to have failed to present a clear-cut definition of the 
state.6 
 
* Professor Merezhko is the Head of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Inter-Parliamentry 
Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. He is also serving as the Vice President of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 
 1. GIOVANNI DISTEFANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SKETCH OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 89 (2019). 
 2. LUIGI CONDORELLI, CHAPTER 7: CUSTOM, IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND PROSPECTS 179 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). 
 3. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102, 201 (The Lawbook Exchange, 
Ltd. ed. 10th prtg. 2010). 
 4. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 2006). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Against this background this paper deals with the concepts of state and 
sovereignty from the perspective of the scientific, i.e. psychological, approach, 
as developed by Leon Petrażycki in his psychological theory of law.7  
Petrażycki viewed legal phenomena as consisting of unique psychical 
processes expressed:  
[I]n the unique form of ascribing to different beings (not only to people, but to 
beings of various other classes, conceived of in the mind), or to certain classes 
of such beings, “duties” and “rights;” so that these beings, so conceived of, are 
seemingly found in certain peculiar conditions of being bound or of possessing 
special objects (“rights”), and the like.8 
According to this theory, law, including international law, is a psychical 
phenomenon which originates in human psyche and which influences human 
psyche.9 Simply put, according to the psychological theory of law, if we wish to 
explore the true nature of such phenomena as international law, state, 
sovereignty, as well as of other institutions of international law, we should turn 
to the study of those psychical processes which take place in the minds of 
individuals, instead of looking for them in the external world, where these 
phenomena, obviously, do not exist.10 
Thus, based on the methodological basis of this theory, I will present the 
concepts of state and sovereignty, as well as the concept of subjects of 
international law. 
I.  THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The second most difficult issue for legal theory (after the eternal question 
“What is law?”) is the question “What is the state?”—in fact, both questions are 
inextricably linked and interrelated, because logically the state, as the legal 
positivists claim, on the one hand, produces law (i.e. is a major law-maker) and, 
on the other hand, is based upon law and is being regulated by law.11 This point 
equally holds true for the relationship between the concept of the state and 
international law, as Alf Ross pointed out:  
We have here a vicious circle: in order to determine whether or not a certain rule 
is international we must know whether or not the legal community bound by it 
is a state. But in order to decide this question we must know precisely whether 
or not the rule in question is international. The term “International Law” is 
defined with reference to the term “state” and the definition of the term “state” 
 
 7. LEON PETRAŻYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY 6 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
ed. 1955). 
 8. Id. at 8. 
 9. Id. at 12, 146. 
 10. Id. at 6–7. 
 11. KRZYSZTOF MOTYKA, LEON PETRAŻYCKI, CHALLENGE TO LEGAL ORTHODOXY 35 
(2007). 
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again refers back to the term “International Law[.”] A definition thus biting on 
its own tail is circular. The consequence is that on the point in question the 
definition is in reality a blank.12 
Not being able to solve this mystery of the relationship between law and 
state logically, some theorists, for instance Hans Kelsen, went as far as offering 
to equate law (normative order) and the state.13 
On the other hand, we can see in the international-legal literature a long-
standing tradition to personify the state. For example, Polish scholar Ludwik 
Ehrlich in his book “Law of Nations” (“Prawo narodów”) pays attention to the 
personification of states, which he considers to be an important phenomenon in 
international law.14 In principle, notes Ehrlich, the state is treated as if it was a 
natural person, possessing will and able to use this will within its territory with 
respect to persons.15 In this sense the state was substituted for the sovereign 
monarch. In human psyche, the state is often represented not as an abstraction 
but as a sort of super-human being or creature like Leviathan.16 Relations 
between the states are often perceived of as relations between living persons.17 
To Professor MacCormick, the state is a “personification” exactly in the 
same sense that we envisage states as acting beings.18 In MacCormick’s view 
the state is “an acting subject, a subject which acts in (at least) the spheres of 
politics, international relations, international law, and domestic public law.”19 
Contemporary international law also attributes to the states certain 
inalienable rights, as if they were individuals. The doctrine of these rights 
originates from the naturalist teachings. As V.D. Degan notes,  
The theory of natural law assimilated States with individual human beings in a 
society. According to this teaching, just as natural persons are entitled to some 
inherent and absolute rights, so all States being members of the international 
community possess some inalienable, indivisible and unassignable rights, 
simply because they exist.20 
 
 12. ALF ROSS, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL PART 12 (The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. ed. 2006). 
 13. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 182 (Anders Wedberg trans., The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed., 3d prtg. 2000). 
 14. LUDWIK EHRLICH, PRAWO NARODÓW 102 (1948). 
 15. Id. 
 16. CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING 
AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL 79 (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., The Univ. of 
Chicago Press ed. 2008). 
 17. George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, 
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY (1991), https://www.arieverhagen.nl/cms/files/George-Lakoff-1991-Meta 
phor-and-War.pdf [https://perma.cc/82P7-LDAY]. 
 18. NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 40 (1999). 
 19. Id. 
 20. V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1997). 
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Among these inalienable states’ rights the following are mentioned: (1) the 
right to existence or preservation, i.e. survival; (2) the right to independence or 
sovereignty; (3) the right to juridical equality, i.e. equality in law; (4) the right 
to be respected; and (5) the right to international communications.21 
These rights look like typical “human” rights, as if the states were human 
beings communicating between each other and deserving “respect” from each 
other. 
What are the most common theoretical mistakes made by the international-
legal theorists writing on the enigma of the state, which prevent them from 
understanding the true nature of it? 
First of all, contemporary legal theorists are looking for the state in the 
wrong place. In fact, the legal theorists still do not know where to locate the 
state, searching for it in different kinds of localization beyond human psyche. 
These theorists often forget the obvious fact that, from a certain point of 
view, everything in the universe can be either a thing (i.e. something material, 
tangible), or a person (to be more precise, a living organism), or an idea (i.e. a 
content of human psyche). It is apparent that the state is neither a thing nor a 
person, even though some theorists tend to perceive the state as some sort of 
super-human being. Hence, the state can be located only in our minds; it can be 
only a content of human psyche as an idea. 
As Petrażycki put it,  
The content of traditional legal science is tantamount to an optical illusion: it 
does not see legal phenomena where they actually occur, but discerns them 
where there is absolutely naught of them—where they cannot be found, 
observed, or known—that is to say, in a world external to the subject who is 
experiencing the legal phenomena.22 
According to the Polish logician Tadeusz Kotarbiński, one of the serious 
logical mistakes is committing a hypostasis (the so-called “hipostaza”), that is, 
imagining the existence of some entities merely because there are certain 
nouns.23 Hypostasis (hipostaza), according to him, is the result of 
hypostatization, i.e. attribution of real identity to something (e.g., to a concept, 
idea) which does not exist in reality.24 Kotarbiński argued that hypostatization 
is dangerous—not so much in practical work of a lawyer but in the course of 
creation of scientific legal theories because it can lead to the emergence of 
erroneous legal philosophies which ascribe real existence to ideal norms as if 
they were persons or things.25 
 
 21. Id. at 84. 
 22. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 8. 
 23. TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI, KURS LOGIKI DLA PRAWNIKÓW 16 (1975). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 18. 
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In terms of Kotarbiński’s logic, we can argue that in the legal theory based 
upon the psychological theory of law we are dealing with judgments (statements, 
assertions) in a psychical sense (psychical act of judging), whereas in the 
juridical dogmatics law is described by means of judgments in the logical 
sense.26 When someone, holds Kotarbiński, expresses a statement which is 
comprehended by the listeners, then in the minds of the listeners appear the 
judgment in the psychical sense, and there are as many such judgments as there 
are listeners.27 So, for example, when a professor of law is telling his students 
about the state, each of the students in the auditorium has his or her own concept 
of the state in his or her mind. 
Judgment in the logical sense, according to Kotarbiński, is the meaning 
(contents) of the sentence.28 Kotarbiński argues that he who subscribes to the 
existence of the judgment in the logical sense thereby creates an impression that 
to all judgments in the psychical sense corresponds one and the same judgment 
in the logical sense as a sort of ideal object called “logical judgment.”29 
However, cautions Kotarbiński, claims regarding existence of the judgment in 
the logical sense create a temptation leading to the mistake of the hypostasis.30 
To put it differently, when we talk about an ideal phenomenon which does not 
exist in time and space (e.g. a legal norm) and which, nevertheless, we can 
imagine as if it is a person or thing, then we create an illusion that this object 
exists in reality. In a word, a legal scholar should be aware of the mistake of 
hypostasis when constructing scientific legal theory. In terms of Petrażycki, he 
should avoid “naïve realism,” i.e. mistakenly ascribing to the words or to the 
psychical phenomena in our mind’s real existence.31 
Despite this obvious fact, the legal theorists in their efforts to conceptualize 
the state continue to commit one of the following mistakes. 
First, they make the mistake of what Petrażycki calls “naïve realism” or 
“naïve projection” point of view, i.e. they tend to wrongly ascribe a real 
existence to the state just because it exists as a psychical reality, as an idea, in 
our minds.32 This erroneous approach to the state stems from the 
anthropomorphic tendencies of the human mind: to the human mind, states look 
like (or are psychically represented as and experienced in our minds as) persons, 
who communicate with each other, quarrel with one other, make treaties, and 
 
 26. Id. at 54. 
 27. Id. 
 28. KOTARBIŃSKI, supra note 23, at 54. 
 29. Id. at 54–55. 
 30. Id. at 55. 
 31. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 32. Id. at 129. 
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become friends or enemies.33 In the international legal documents this 
anthropomorphic approach is discernible when we encounter such concepts as 
“will” of a state or “intent” of a state, i.e. when we ascribe to the states psychical 
attributes as if the states were living persons.34 
A typical example of such a mistake in contemporary international-legal 
theory is a currently popular concept of international law by Professor 
Koskenniemi, who writes: 
A law which would lack distance from State behaviour, will or interest would 
amount to a non-normative apology, a mere sociological description. A law 
which would base itself on principles which are unrelated to State behavior, will 
or interest would seem utopian, incapable of demonstrating its own content in 
any reliable way. To show that international law exists, with some degree of 
reality, the modern lawyer needs to show that the law is simultaneously 
normative and concrete – that it binds a State regardless of that State’s behavior, 
will or interest but that its content can nevertheless be verified by reference to 
actual State behavior, will or interest.35 
In these words Professor Koskenniemi paints a picture of states’ “behavior” 
as if the states were living creatures possessing their own “will” and 
“interests.”36 He does not explain here what exactly he means by “reality” of 
international law: is it a physical, psychical, or some kind of other “reality?” 
As Petrażycki pointed out, “the terminology of jurists and their ideas of law 
rest upon a naïve-projection point of view which accepts as real legal phenomena 
impulsion phantasmata: norms (‘commands’ and ‘prohibitions’) addressed to 
persons subject to the law and the legal relations between individuals (their 
obligations and their rights).”37  
This naïve-projection point of view, maintained Petrażycki, raises a whole 
series of essentially insoluble problems as to the nature of the corresponding 
realities, including the state, and the jurists resort to fictitious, arbitrary, and 
fanciful speculations like nonexistent “wills” of the states.38 
The second mistake made by legal theorists is the “naïve-nihilistic” 
approach to the state and other subjects of international law. This occurs when 
some legal theorists mistakenly deny, as Petrażycki would put it, “the existence 
of a subject (which undoubtedly exists and can be readily found in the subject’s 
 
 33. George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, 
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY (1991), https://www.arieverhagen.nl/cms/files/George-Lakoff-1991-Meta 
phor-and-War.pdf [https://perma.cc/82P7-LDAY]. 
 34. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 128–129. 
 35. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 17 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
 36. Id. at 59. 
 37. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 7, at 62. 
 38. Id. 
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very judgement) and therefore the existence of the judgement itself, because of 
disbelief in the existence of an irrelevant object in an improper sphere.”39 
For instance, this mistake is made by those theorists who deny the existence 
of the state as any kind of reality just because we cannot find the state in the 
external world as a material thing or a living organism.40 To these theorists, the 
state is, in the final analysis, nothing but an aggregate of individuals.41 
For example, to Hans Kelsen the state is a sort of “fictitious person” to which 
we attribute (or impute) the acts of certain natural persons; and this “attribution” 
is also a fiction to him.42 
Finally, there is a group of legal theorists who, instead of exploring the true 
nature of the state as a psychical phenomenon, engage in the construction of 
diverse fantastic concepts (e.g. state as an “organic whole,” social organism, 
person, etc.).43 Such erroneous theories were described by Petrażycki as the 
“naïve-speculative” or “naïve-constructive” theories because the legal theorists 
are trying to postulate the state’s existence beyond human psyche.44 
The contemporary international-legal scholarship seems perplexed by the 
true nature of the state. An example of this is the following statement by 
Professor Crawford, who wrote: “A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is 
a fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a 
legal status attaching to certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules . . . .”45 
As we can see from this statement, Professor Crawford, on the one hand, 
acknowledges that the state is not a thing, is not “a fact” in material sense, yet, 
on the other hand, he does not explain where this “fact” can be found: in the 
human mind or beyond it.46 
At the same time, Professor Crawford’s comparison between the state and a 
treaty is quite correct, for both the state and treaty have the same psychical 
nature, both of them are the psychical “fact,” existing in the minds of 
individuals.47 
Hans Kelsen, who was also a critic of the naïve-realistic perception of the 
state, came very close to the understanding of the true nature of the state.48 
Kelsen, writing about the state as a specific legal order, rightly pointed out that 
 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. DAVID RUNCIMAN, THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A FICTION, IN 
STATES AND CITIZENS: HISTORY, THEORY, PROSPECTS 28–29 (Quentin Skinner & Bo Strath eds., 
2003). 
 41. KELSEN, supra note 13, at 255. 
 42. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 299–300 (Univ. Cal. Press 1967) (1934). 
 43. LEON PETRAŻYCKI, TEORIJA PRAVA I GOSUDARSTVA V SVJAZI S TEORIJEJ 
NRAVSTVENNOSTI 165–66 (2000) 
 44. Id. at 167. 
 45. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. PETRAŻYCKI, supra note 43, at 362. 
 48. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 430. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
30 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:23 
“the state is believed to be an object of regulation only because the 
anthropomorphic personification of this order leads us first to liken it to a human 
individual and then to mistake it for a superhuman individual.”49 
In other words, he was critical about what he called “the inadmissible 
hypostatization” of the state.50 
Interestingly enough, in his early works, Kelsen, being aware of the 
psychical nature of the state, conceived of the state as “a personifying fiction,” 
an idea which formed a parallel to the idea of God.51 Kelsen considered “the 
meta-legal state, transcending the law” to be nothing else than the hypostatized 
personification.52 According to him, the unity of the state, postulated as real, was 
similar to “the supernatural deity transcending nature, who is nothing else than 
the grandiose anthropomorphic personification of the unity of nature itself.”53 
It can be argued that in principle Kelsen, just like Petrażycki, postulated the 
psychical nature of the state as an idea in the mind of the individual.54 At the 
same time, he was not quite consistent in his reasoning, because he had stopped 
short of acknowledging the psychical nature of law, which is created by the state 
(as legal positivists claim) or which is the synonym of the state (as Kelsen 
thought).55 
It is of interest to us that Kelsen tried to comprehend and describe the socio-
psychical evolution of the state. To him, the state, as a social phenomenon 
(“social bond”), manifested itself in “the idea of a certain community, of 
common organization, of common territory, etc.”56 In his view, the state is “the 
guiding idea,” an ideology, the realization of which is a psychical process 
leading to the closer ties between the members of the social group.57 
At a certain point in the socio-psychical evolution of the social group the 
idea of the leader of the group (as a personification of this group in the minds of 
its members) yields to the abstract idea of the state.58 
Kelsen recognized that only the subjective psychical processes in the mind 
of an individual are real, and that this is a psychical reality.59 As for the 
“objectivity” of the social institutions, including the state, it remained to him 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Hans Kelsen, The Conception of the State and Social Psychology With Special Reference 
to Freud’s Group Theory, 5 INT’L J. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1, 37 (1924). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. KELSEN, supra note 13, at 182. 
 56. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 6. 
 57. Id. at 6, 23. 
 58. Id. at 23. 
 59. Id. 
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enigmatic how the real psychical subjectivity can, by mere aggregation or 
multiplication, become an equally real social objectivity.60 
Parallelism of the psychical processes taking place in a society, argued 
Kelsen, can create a tendency to declare the “folk-spirit” or “common will,” 
“common emotion,” to be a psychical reality differing from the individual 
psyche, whereby these conceptions might acquire the metaphysical character of 
the Hegelian “objective spirit.”61 
Kelsen’s thoughts on the state can be compared to that of Mikhail Reisner, 
who tried to elaborate his own socio-psychological concept of the state on the 
methodological foundation of Petrażycki’s teaching.62 In his seminal book, “The 
State,” Rejsner, having consistently applied psychological method to the 
teaching on the state, had presented it as a socio-psychical phenomenon, as an 
ideology, as well as an organized by means of this ideology “mass human 
behavior.”63 Three elements of the state (territory, population, and power), 
according to Rejsner, are not tangible, material phenomena but, rather, concepts 
or ideas, by means of which the political behavior of people is being organized.64 
In the state’s structure Rejsner distinguishes three elements: (1) human psyche, 
as a major source of the state’s ideology; (2) ideology itself, which is dependent 
upon concrete historical conditions; and (3) political behavior of people, as a 
result of the expression of state’s ideas in human life and activities.65 He also 
came to the conclusion that from the scientific point of view such concepts as 
“the omnipresent state power,” “unity of people in the state,” and “territorial 
supremacy” are nothing but fictions.66 
In regard to Kelsen’s teaching, it can be argued that he tried to find the 
answers to the same questions as Petrażycki and, at least initially, had been 
looking for those answers in the same place as Petrażycki did, that is, in the 
psyche of individuals.67 However, at the end of the day, he chose a different 
methodological path in the legal science by opting for the juridical-dogmatic, 
instead of psychological, approach to law and state.68 
Later on, Kelsen had started to draw parallels between the state and the 
corporation. He wrote: 
The state is, of course, not a natural or physical person, not a man or a 
superman. It is a so called juristic person, or, what amounts to the same, a 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 23. 
 62. MIKHAIL REISNER, GOSUDARSTVO, CHAST’ I. KUL’TURNO-ISTORICHESKIE OSNOVY 18 
(1911). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
 65. Id. at 16. 
 66. Id. at 17. 
 67. Kelsen, supra note 51, at 2. 
 68. KELSEN, supra note 42, at 105. 
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corporation. As a juristic person the state is personification of a social order, 
constituting the community we call “state.” If we try to characterize the 
phenomenon “state” without using a personification, we have no other 
possibility than to say that the state is a social order, or the community 
constituted by this order . . . .69 
In this passage from Kelsen we have a rather typical example of conflation 
of three different concepts of the state: (1) state as a psychical representation in 
the minds of individuals (“personification” of social or legal order in the psyche 
of individuals); (2) state as a social group (sociological concept of the state); and 
(3) state as a formal-legal construction, as a range of legal norms (juridical-
dogmatic concept of the state).70 
The point is that we should not mix together these three different concepts 
of the state, but instead we should carefully distinguish them from one another. 
Another error, often made by the legal theorists in their attempts to 
conceptualize the state, is a conflation of the theoretical and practical 
approaches, which should be strictly distinguished. The theoretical approach 
explores the state as a phenomenon of reality as it is, not what it should be.71 
This is the only scientific approach, if we understand by science the realm of 
knowledge dealing with reality, not metaphysics.72 Practical approach to the 
state is, in its turn, about the state as it should be, as it is expressed in the legal 
norms.73 In terms of the Kelsen theory we can say that legal theory studies the 
state as a phenomenon of “isness,” whereas practical approach explores the state 
as belonging to the realm of “oughtness.”74 
But what is the state in international-legal theory; how is it presented? 
There are no international-legal norms of general international law which 
would define the state. International-legal theory is also helpless, when it comes 
to the scientific definition of the state.  
The international document most widely quoted in connection with the 
concept of statehood in international law is the Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States of 1933, which holds: “[t]he State as a person of 
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with other States.”75  
 
 69. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 100. 
 70. Id. 
 71. L.I. PETRAŻYCKI, TEORIJA I POLITIKA PRAVA. IZBRANNYE TRUDY, 241 (2010). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 421–22. 
 74. CARLOS MIGUEL HERRERA, LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT DE HANS KELSEN, UNE 
INTRODUCTION 17 (2004). 
 75. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, signed with reservations 
Dec. 26, 1933. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] THE MYSTERY OF THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 
This formulation, sometimes with slight nuances, has been widely accepted 
in international-legal theory.76 So, traditionally, the state in international law is 
described as an entity constituted by three elements: (1) territory, ( 2) population, 
and (3) government.77 
From the traditional international-legal theory perspective a state exists as 
long as these criteria are met, and there is no need in its recognition on the part 
of the other states.78  
To illustrate how ludicrous and far from reality this concept of the state can 
be, we can give the following examples from the field of international relations. 
The case in point is Taiwan (officially “The Republic of China”) which 
possesses all the attributes of a sovereign state and, yet, does not consider itself 
to be a de jure independent state.79 Taiwan presents a hard case for those 
theorists who believe that the best hallmark of statehood in international law is 
membership in the UN, because Taiwan used to represent China on the Security 
Council until 1971.80 
Another example is Kosovo. The question here is whether or not it is a 
sovereign state under international law. If we apply the criteria of statehood that 
are offered by the international-legal doctrine, then we should regard Kosovo as 
a sovereign state, because it has its territory, population, and government. 
Moreover, it is recognized as a state by a number of states and maintains 
diplomatic relations with them. It seems that Kosovo is a state for some states 
(e.g. for the US and a number of the European states), while for the other states 
it is not an independent state.81 For Serbia, for instance, Kosovo is not a 
sovereign state, but an integral part of its territory.82 
Interestingly, from the juridical-dogmatic point of view, the legal status of 
Kosovo remains indeterminate. So, those who recognize Kosovo as a sovereign 
state refer to the normative fact in the form of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the 
unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, whereas those who 
view it as a part of Serbia refer to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999) in which the UN member-states reaffirmed their “commitment to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”83 
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These examples clearly indicate that in the realm of juridical dogmatics, the 
logical law (principle) of the excluded third does not hold.  
Another example is Northern Cyprus (officially “the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus”), which is a sovereign state for Turkey, but not for other 
states.84  
There is also a number of other such states, the so-called “unrecognized 
states” or “semi-recognized” states.85 Again, if we apply the abovementioned 
criteria of statehood, we can argue that they are sovereign states. Moreover, it 
can be equally argued that ISIS is also a sovereign state, because it has its own, 
however specific it might be, territory, population, and government.86 
These criteria, which are offered for the determination of statehood, are also 
unreliable when taken separately. 
First of all, as regards territory, history of mankind knows examples of states 
which did not have permanent territory, such as nomadic empires. That is why 
the statement that “a state without a territory is not possible” is historically 
wrong.87 
The definition of the state territory given in international-legal doctrine is 
circular and contains logical mistake definitio per idem. Let us consider as an 
example of this mistake the following definition: “[s]tate territory is that defined 
portion of the globe which is subjected to the sovereignty of a state.”88 
This definition is logically erroneous because X (state territory) is defined 
through X (state territory as a constitutive element of state). Additionally, there 
is another X in this formula: state sovereignty, which also constitutes an element 
of the state. 
Different states and individuals can consider the same territory as belonging 
to different states. A case in point is Crimea.89 
The concept of population might be equally confusing, because in reality 
there is no such a thing as a permanent population: people are born, die, travel 
abroad, come as immigrants, and leave as emigrants. There is also such subject 
of international law as the Holy See which has no population, apart from resident 
functionaries, with the purpose to support it as a religious organization.90 
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As for the government, in the case of a civil war within given territory there 
might be not one, but several different “governments” claiming to be the only 
“legitimate” government. 
All these examples illustrate to us the point that territory, population, and 
governments are not something material, nor are they some kind of things, but, 
rather, they are ideas present in the minds of individuals. 
The same also holds true for the state: for it is not a thing or person, but a 
psychical representation in the consciousness of an individual. In other words, 
in the consciousness of one individual a certain social group might be a 
sovereign state, while for the other it might be not an independent state, but 
something else: for instance, a social group within a state. 
Such a difference between legal convictions of different individuals on the 
existence or non-existence of a particular state is, at least potentially, a cause of 
serious conflicts in international relations. Each of these disputing individuals to 
substantiate his or her position might refer to different legal rules and 
documents. And one of the best ways to settle such a dispute would be to refer 
it for solution by a third party, for instance, to an international tribunal or a court 
of arbitration.  
The mystery of the state in international law can be unraveled only on the 
basis of the psychological theory of law. This theory of law, as a phenomenon 
of the psychical (not physical) reality, is a specific imperative-attributive 
impulsion (in terms of Leon Petrażycki, a “legal emotion”).91 As an imperative-
attributive impulsion, law represents a psychical experience of bilateral 
character: it combines both obligation (duty) and claim (right).92 
To put it simply, law is in the mind of that person who experiences legal 
judgment and we should not confuse law with the forms of its expression and 
objectivation (such as legal text).  
Petrażycki wrote:  
The prevailing view holds that possession of a definite territory is an essential 
element of a state. Tradition distinguishes three elements in the state: territory, 
population, and authority. It must, therefore, be emphasized with particular force 
that neither a definite territory nor a settled population is of any significance 
whatsoever from the point of view of the psychological theory that the state 
organization consists of impulsive-intellectual phenomena . . . plus the 
corresponding coordinated behavior. Even nomad social groups, or groups 
formerly settled but later shifting to other territories under the power and 
leadership of their princes are to be included in the class “state”. . .93 
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In other words, the elements of a state, such as territory, population, and 
government, are also objects of representation in the human psyche.94 
To sum up, in Petrażycki’s teaching the state is either a social group in which 
the supreme power belongs (that is to say, is projected; ascribed by the national 
legal mentality) to various beings (such as gods, monarchs, supreme councils, 
parliaments, etc.) or an object of representation in a human psyche.95 He also 
does not deny the juridical-dogmatic concept of the state.96 
Thus, talking about the nature of the state we can distinguish three 
approaches to its analysis leading to three different concepts of the state: (1) 
psychological approach, (2) sociological, and (3) juridical-dogmatic. 
All three approaches to the state differ, and the concepts built upon them 
should not be conflated and should be kept apart. 
From the psychological perspective the state is a psychical projection in the 
mind of an individual. At the same time the state might be (but not always is) a 
psychical representation of a certain social reality in the psyche of the individual. 
In other words, the idea of the state in the mind of an individual might “mirror” 
a certain social reality.97 
The sociological concept of the state postulates the state as a social reality, 
as an independent social group united by the legal convictions of the people 
which are manifested in their coordinated behavior.98 It should be also noted that 
the Weberian sociological view of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
as the principal hallmark of statehood is dubious.99 The trouble with this 
definition of the state is that the term “legitimate” presupposes existence of law, 
and the question arises: what is the law and who makes it? If it is the state which 
makes the law, then we have circularity in this definition. 
In our opinion, the juridical-dogmatic concept of the state views it as a range 
of normative facts or as a set of legal norms linked to each other logically. 
The interesting and complicated issues arise when we try to understand the 
relationships between these three concepts of the state. The scheme of these 
relationships might look as follows: the psychical representation of a state in the 
mind of an individual represents a certain “social reality” in the form of the 
coordinated behavior of individuals which can be observed.100 On the other 
hand, in our opinion, the psychical representation of the state in the individual’s 
mind does not necessarily represent any “social reality,” or it might “distort” the 
“social reality.” For instance, despite such “social reality” as Taiwan in the 
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capacity of an independent social entity, different international lawyers view it 
differently.101 
The psychical reality of the state, in turn, might find its expression in the 
legal norms with which deals juridical dogmatics. At the same time, different 
dogmaticians can refer to different normative facts to “prove” or “disprove” the 
existence of a particular state.102 For example, Turkish lawyers might refer to 
the normative fact related to the recognition of Northern Cyprus as a sovereign 
state by Turkey; while other lawyers might refer to the corresponding Security 
Council resolution as a normative fact precluding recognition of Northern 
Cyprus as a sovereign state. 
The best way to solve such conflicts of different normative facts is to refer 
the issue to the third party, i.e. to an international court or arbitration. 
A. Identity and Continuity of States 
Basically, the concept of the state’s continuity is about the idea that a state’s 
existence is undisturbed by any change of its government.103 Before the 
seventeenth century there was the notion that each reign was a separate 
sovereignty unfettered by earlier treaty commitments, and it was due to the fact 
that national legal consciousness ascribed sovereignty (i.e. the highest authority 
in the state) to the individual (i.e. to the monarch or sovereign).104 Over the 
course of the seventeenth century in the mass legal consciousness, a psychical 
revolution occurred as a result of which the sovereignty started to ascribe not to 
the idea of the monarch but to the abstract idea of the state.105 As M.J. Peterson 
puts it:  
The new rule posited that a monarch’s public treaties bound any successor – 
whether an heir, a usurper, or revolutionaries establishing a non-monarchical 
government. Well before 1815, then, there was consensus that the state’s own 
international legal personality, and with it the rights and duties it holds under 
both general international law and the specific treaties to which it is a party, 
remained undisturbed by any change of government.106 
Another idea which took hold in the mass legal consciousness at that time 
was that the state is possessor of complete legal personality under international 
law, whereas the governments are only “the human agents” of states having only 
those rights and obligations which are necessary to perform this role.107 In other 
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words, in the legal consciousness the idea of the government was subjected to 
the idea of the state.108 
In the interwar period, due to a wave of revolutions in Europe, an idea 
emerged that a great enough transformation (e.g., social revolution in Russia in 
1917) might amount to the creation of a new state.109 First Soviet lawyers, for 
instance, had argued that there is no identity or continuity between the new 
Soviet state and the Russian Empire, that they are two different states and two 
different subjects of international law.110 The European states, however, 
continued to see Soviet Russia as the same state subject to international law and 
considered the Soviet government to be obliged to pay the Tsarist debts.111 
In contemporary international law, continuity and identity of states basically 
mean that a state continues its existence (preserves its identity) as the same 
person, despite changes (sometimes considerable) in its population, territory, 
and government.112 For example, a state might undergo substantial 
transformation (change its name, constitution, political regime, borders, etc.) 
and yet continue to be regarded as the same state and the same subject of 
international law.113 A case in point is Germany, which despite tremendous 
changes in territory, political system, and population during the twentieth 
century, had preserved its identity as a state. Poland preserved its identity since 
1918 even when it was under occupation during World War II. 
An even more curious example is Russia’s status as the self-proclaimed 
“continuator” of the USSR despite the fact that Russia (the Russian Soviet 
Federative Republic) and the USSR were two different states. 
These examples illustrate to us how artificial the concept of the state can be 
when taken beyond its psychical nature. The thing is that the identity/continuity 
of the state is not something existing in the external world, but a psychical 
phenomenon. In reality, the state’s identity/continuity exists in the minds of 
individuals, e.g. politicians and statespersons. For example: in the minds of the 
Soviet statespersons the FRG had emerged in 1949, whereas German 
statespersons believed that there has been continuity of the German State since 
1871, despite all political transformations.114 
The birth and death of a state also occurs in the minds of individuals. Hans 
Kelsen with respect to the birth and death of a state writes: 
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It is generally recognized that the question whether a new state has come into 
existence or an old state has ceased to exist is to be answered on the basis of 
international law. The relevant principles of international law are commonly 
stated as follows: A state comes into existence when a group of individuals 
living on a definite territory are organized under an effective and independent 
government; and a state ceases to exist when it loses one of its essential 
elements—population, its territory, or its independent effective government. A 
government is independent if it is not legally under the influence of the 
government of another state; and it is effective if it is able to obtain permanent 
obedience to the coercive order issued by it.115 
From the psychological theory’s perspective, the situation looks different. 
A state comes into existence when a majority of the individuals living in the 
given territory start to believe that they live in one state, i.e. when they ascribe 
in their minds the corresponding rights to those people whom they consider to 
be their government. On the other hand, a state ceases to exist when the majority 
of its population stops believing in this state and stops ascribing the highest 
authority to the individuals constituting the government of this state. Sometimes, 
to make a psychical revolution in the minds of the population of the given 
territory, leading to the death of a state, it is enough to adopt a normative fact, 
e.g. a declaration of independence, as was the case with the Soviet republics in 
1991 after the aborted coup d’état in Moscow. 
As for the government’s “effectiveness,” Kelsen writes, it does not depend 
on the government’s ability “to obtain permanent obedience to the coercive 
order,” because legal order and the state are not based on coercion, but rather on 
the people’s voluntary submission, stemming from their natural psychical 
tendency to ascribe the highest authority to the individuals whom they consider 
to be their government.116 
B. Recognition of States 
Historically, international law, as a European international law (Jus 
Publicum Europaeum), had been a sort of rules of the exclusive club of the 
European states, which considered themselves to be “civilized” and which 
decided who, and on what conditions, should be admitted to membership in this 
club.117 In fact, to be admitted to that international community of the “civilized” 
states, an entity should have been “recognized” by the members of that 
community.118 Hence, this is the constitutive effect of recognition and popularity 
of the constitutive theory of recognition among legal theorists at that time.119 
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Later on, in view of the emergence of the new national-states on the ruins of the 
empires, especially after World War I and during the decolonization of the 
sixties, the constitutive theory of recognition yielded to the declaratory theory, 
which claims that the state is being born from the fact, which does not need 
recognition on the part of other states.120 The proponents of the declaratory 
theory of recognition liked to recall the story with Napoleon, who, when offered 
to recognize the existence of the French Republic, responded that it “did not 
require or desire recognition,” because “it is already as the sun on the horizon in 
Europe.”121  
However, nowadays we can observe a sort of revival of the constitutive 
theory of recognition, because in the disputable cases the best criterion to 
determine the existence of the state is its admission to the United Nations as a 
member-state.122 This admission might be viewed as having a constitutive effect 
for the state’s existence as a subject of international law. 
In traditional international-legal doctrine, recognition remains a riddle 
because there are no clear and objective criteria to determine conditions for 
recognition. According to some international-legal theorists, “premature” 
recognition of an entity seeking to secede from an existing state before that 
entity’s consolidation as an independent state amounts to violation of the general 
rules of international law.123 Such premature recognition might be viewed as an 
unlawful intervention.124 However, as the case of the “unrecognized” or de facto 
states indicate, international law does not provide any reliable guidance as to the 
moment when a given entity becomes an independent state.  
Hans Kelsen points out that international law leaves the decision on the 
recognition of a given community as a state to the interested governments, 
because, according to him, legal recognition of a community as a state is “only 
a particular case of the general principle according to which the existence of 
facts to which international law attaches legal consequence has to be ascertained 
by the governments which are interested in these facts in a concrete case.”125 
In reality it means that those individuals, of whom the government is 
composed, should decide whether or not the given community is a state. 
An interesting case in connection with the issue of states’ recognition in 
international law presents the case of Kosovo which became the subject matter 
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of heated debates among international lawyers from different countries. For 
instance, Christian Tomuschat in this respect notes: 
The recognition of a State must be considered as unlawful if the territorial entity 
concerned is unable, under any conceivable aspect, to meet the minimum 
requirement of statehood. States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. But their 
discretion is not boundless. In principle the criteria of statehood are beyond 
question.126 
This statement might be interpreted in the following way: the freedom of 
states to recognize other entities as states is not unlawful in so far as the entity 
in question possesses the necessary features of a state, such as territory, 
population, and government. If so, then any of the “unrecognized states” can be 
recognized by other states and this move will not be regarded as a violation of 
the existent states’ territorial integrity. 
At the same time, Professor Tomuschat acknowledges that “as far as the 
population is concerned, the first question is who decides about its 
composition.”127 
Again, it can be argued that for some theorists or statesmen in case of 
Kosovo “the population” means population of Kosovo, whereas for others there 
is only one “population,” which is the population of the whole of Serbia, its 
“people” which has the right to self-determination.128 
Nowadays the states’ practice supports the declaratory theory of recognition, 
according to which “the legal effects of recognition are limited: recognition is a 
declaration or acknowledgment of an existing state of law and fact, legal 
personality having been conferred previously by operation of law.”129 
This approach is an example of the naïve-realism in law, for by “operation 
of law” it implies that there is some sort of “law” existing out there (i.e. beyond 
human psyche) in itself and capable of “conferring” legal personality upon the 
candidates.130 In reality this “conferral” of legal personality, as well as 
“acknowledgment of an existing state of law and fact” occurs in the human 
mind.131 A case of unrecognized states is indicative here, because in the minds 
of some individuals they are states, whereas in the minds of others they are not. 
Constitutive theory of recognition, which has fallen out of favor with the 
contemporary legal theorists, in its “extreme form . . . implies that the very 
personality of a state depends on the political decision of other states.”132 
Is this theory more correct than the declaratory theory? 
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When we take as an example such a “community” as ISIS, then yes, because 
despite all the attributes of a state (territory, population, and government), the 
states (to be precise, their leaders) have taken the “political decision” not to 
recognize it as a state, but to consider it to be an international terroristic 
organization.  
In the literature connected with the issue of recognition were considered the 
concepts of such states as: de facto state and quasi-state.133 
De facto states, according to Scott Pegg, are “entities which feature long-
term, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leadership that 
provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial 
area,” which “seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of 
meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood.”134 
Among examples of such de facto states this author mentions: Eritrea before 
independence, the republic of Somaliland, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, Biafra, Chechnya, Krajina, Taiwan, Kosovo, and South Sudan.135 
Among these de facto states, Eritrea and South Sudan gained broad recognition 
by becoming UN member-states.136 
The so called “quasi-states” are viewed as the flip-side of the de facto states 
coin. Quasi-states, in contrast to de facto states, are primarily juridical.137 The 
quasi-states are internationally recognized, are UN members and regarded as 
sovereign states, but they do not function positively as viable governing 
entities.138 Sometimes in the territory of a quasi-state might be a de facto state.139 
To put it differently, when we talk about the dichotomy of de facto state and 
quasi-state, we have an issue of social reality versus legal form. 
The issue of whether a de facto state is a subject of international law boils 
down to the question of “whether statehood is considered a fact existing outside 
the realm of law or whether it is a legal status determined by law.”140 According 
to Roland Portmann: 
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[S]tatehood is not simply a matter of effectiveness, but is to a considerable 
degree regulated by international law. A state does not simply exist as a matter 
of fact: the existence of a state is determined by meeting international legal 
standards and failure to do so implies denial of statehood in international law. 
The state is then not a given fact from which international law simply starts, but 
a legal entity deriving its status and its powers from the international legal 
system itself.141 
However, in this definition of statehood we once again have circularity. 
When to understand what the state (or statehood) is, we need first to know what 
international law (or international legal system) is; but to know what 
international law is we need to have a concept of the state in advance because 
international law is created by the states and governs relations between them. 
Besides, proceeding from the abovementioned definition, we also need to know 
who is that person or institution (social or legal) that would decide on whether 
or not the given social entity meets “international legal standards” of statehood.  
According to Professor Portmann, “statehood is a legal status derived from 
or denied by international norms.”142 Here again we might ask a question: who 
exactly grants or denies this legal status? “International norms” as such, or 
individuals who represent states and who interpret and apply international 
norms? 
In reality, the existence of a state for other states (to be more precise for the 
statesmen representing their states) might depend on their recognition of the 
given entity as a state.143 
Psychological theory of law offers the following explanation of the issue of 
recognition in international law. 
Recognition in international law is a normative fact which creates a change 
in the individual and national legal mind (psyche, consciousness).144 By means 
of this normative fact takes place the change of attitude of individuals with 
respect to a social fact (de facto state).145 In other words, recognition, as a 
normative fact, creates in the minds of people the psychical representation of the 
given community as a state under international law. In this sense recognition as 
a normative fact is constitutive. 
There are several kinds of such normative facts. The first kind of normative 
fact is recognition of a given state by the certain government by means of the act 
of national legislation.146 Of special interest and importance is recognition 
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granted by the state to the secessionist entity in its territory.147 An example of 
this is Russia’s recognition of the independence of Chechnya in 1996. Such a 
recognition might stop a bloody war for independence of a secessionist 
movement and lead to the psychical revolution in the minds of people. 
Second, there is recognition by means of the admission of a given 
community to the UN membership.148 In this case such an admission is viewed 
as the most authoritative normative fact.149 
Sometimes an advisory opinion of the UN International Court of Justice can 
be a normative fact, to which statespersons and politicians can refer to prove the 
international-legal existence of a state.150 A known example of that is the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence.151 
Recognition of a state can also be collective and take the form of the joint 
declaration (i.e., normative fact), as was the case after the First World War with 
the declaration issued by the Allied Supreme Council.152 
C. The Concept of Sovereignty in International Law 
Sovereignty, as was pointed out above, is a cornerstone of the whole system 
of international law without which it cannot exist, because international law by 
its nature is a system of law governing relations between sovereign entities.153 
It can even be argued that international law was born with sovereignty and that 
it will wither away along with sovereignty. 
Despite this, the very concept of the sovereignty seems unclear and 
controversial. So, for example, one of the leading researchers of this concept 
defined the sovereignty as a “specific feature of the state or the state power, due 
to which it is legally highest and independent.”154  
In other words, the sovereignty is ascribed to the state, or ascribed to its 
power, as a certain feature or quality. Hence, everything depends on how we 
define the state: as a psychical phenomenon, as a social phenomenon, or as a set 
of legal rules. 
It means that we have not one, but three different concepts of sovereignty: 
(1) juridical-dogmatic concept, (2) psychological, and (3) sociological. 
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The juridical-dogmatic concept of sovereignty might be purely symbolic, 
even formalistic and sometimes having nothing to do with the social reality.155 
An interesting illustration presents the case of Ukraine’s sovereignty before 
declaration of independence in 1991.  
Symbolic sovereignty, as expressed in the text of the constitutions of the 
USSR and Soviet Ukraine (which was a sort of dormant constitutional norm), 
was used as a normative fact by Ukrainian political elites in 1991 to proclaim 
independence and to create a truly sovereign state.156 
In this example we see a contradiction between the juridical-dogmatic 
concept of the Ukrainian state, as expressed in the Ukraine’s and Soviet 
constitutions, on the one hand, and the social reality, on the other hand. We can 
say that in the case of Ukraine, the juridical-dogmatic concept of sovereignty 
had transformed into the social reality only then, when in the collective psyche 
of the Ukrainian elites the highest authority (supremacy of power) had shifted 
from the USSR (government in Moscow) to the Ukraine (government in Kyiv). 
Supremacy of power can be explained in the terms of the psychological 
theory by the natural tendency of a human being in the case of conflicting 
commands from different subjects to obey only one of these subjects.157 Here is 
how Petrażycki explains this tendency:  
Endowing more than one subject with the right to exert authority over identical 
subordinates would, in accordance with the attributive and adversary nature of 
the law, lead to more or less sharp (and possibly sanguinary) conflicts if the 
various persons possessing that authority could issue different (perhaps 
diametrically opposed) commands with a like claim to require the execution 
thereof. Characteristically, the legal consciousness tends so to adapt the relevant 
convictions and the actual experiences (the consciousness of a duty of 
subordination and of a right to obedience) that in individual cases—in particular 
where the orders of various superiors are contradictory—the actual duty of 
obedience is acknowledged with regard to one, and not to two or more, of those 
who issue the commands. In precisely the same manner, the legal consciousness 
of those who issue the commands ordinarily the idea that substantially diverse 
commands of others be obeyed at the same time. Thereby conflicts are 
prevented.158 
Thus, within the given territory of a state, the holder of the supreme power 
(a sovereign) is he to whom the legal consciousness of the majority of a 
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population acknowledges the duty of obedience.159 To secure this obedience, a 
state apparatus might use different instruments and mechanisms, including 
persuasion, propaganda, manipulation, terror, and “brainwashing.”160 If 
democratic states rely more on persuasion, the dictatorial and totalitarian 
regimes might reach for open terror and “brainwashing.”161 
Where does an individual get the deceptive feeling of the “objectivity” of 
the sovereign’s power from? The fact is that the behavior of those people who 
surround this individual creates in his mind an additional psychical pressure to 
obey the commands of the sovereign.162 An individual is psychologically prone 
to follow the pattern of behavior of people surrounding him. There is something 
which Petrażycki called “the emotional-intellectual contagion (infection).”163 
Under the influence of this “contagion” an individual is inclined to obey the 
sovereign.164  
If a population of a given state splits with regard to its obedience to different 
centers of power within the state, it might lead to civil war and state’s 
disintegration, as was the case with the former Yugoslavia.165 
What is called sovereignty in international legal theory Petrażycki called 
“supreme social authority” and defined it as the “general social authority above 
which there is none in the hierarchy—so that the subject of this authority is 
bound to be concerned about the general welfare only as regards subordinates or 
definite social groups—but not as regards any subject of higher authority.”166 
Supreme power in the state might be ascribed by national legal mentality to 
various beings (to the gods, prince, king, parliament, president, etc.).167 
It is noteworthy that Kelsen’s concept of sovereignty bears a striking 
resemblance to that of Petrażycki. First of all, Kelsen argues that in the “world 
of physical reality, there is no such thing as sovereignty.”168 Hence, we can argue 
that sovereignty belongs to the realm of the psychical reality. This point finds 
corroboration in the following words by Kelsen: “The state is sovereign if we 
conceive it to be sovereign, if we conceive the order of the state to be highest. It 
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is not sovereign if we proceed from a different assumption.”169 The words “we 
conceive” in this phrase indicate to us that we deal here with a psychical 
experience. Besides, just like Petrażycki, to Kelsen the term “sovereignty” 
means “the highest authority.”170 
According to some theorists of international law, behind the concept of 
sovereignty is the state’s “competence-competence,” i.e. the full state’s ability 
to determine the forms in which the state’s functions are performed.171 This 
state’s ability (i.e. sovereignty) does not emerge from the state’s self-
determination, but from international law.172 
German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch in his “Rechtsphisophie” also 
argued that sovereignty is nothing but an “international legal feature of the 
subject” and that “the state is a subject of international law not because it is 
sovereign, but, on the contrary, it is sovereign because it is a subject of 
international law.”173 Radbruch was confident that the notion of sovereignty 
should be developed not from natural legal views independently from 
international law, but rather directly from international law, following its 
method.174 
If we accept the thesis that sovereignty is derived from international law 
then we ascribe in our psyche sovereignty (i.e. the highest authority) not to the 
state but to the abstract idea of international law or to the international 
community. In this case the object of representation of the international law or 
international community manifests itself as a sort of God who bestows upon 
states the highest authority. Logically, we have a vicious circle here because 
sovereign states create international law and international law confers 
sovereignty upon the states. 
Criticizing the concept that the state is sovereign when its power is limited 
solely by international law Alf Ross wrote: 
The attempt to characterize the subject of International Law, the sovereign state, 
by the criterion of “sole subjection to International Law” is evidently 
meaningless if with the prevailing doctrine we take it for granted—as most of 
the adherents of the theory do—that International Law is defined as the law 
binding upon states. It is said first that International Law is the law binding upon 
states; next that states are the communities which are bound solely by 
International Law. This is evidently a vicious circle. In order to decide whether 
or not a community is a (sovereign) state we must first know whether or not the 
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rules by which it is bound are international. But to know whether or not a rule is 
international we must first know whether or not the subjects bound by it are 
(sovereign) states. It is a disgrace to us that such an obvious absurdity marks the 
current theory of International Law.175 
Thus, the concept of sovereignty means a certain psychical experience, 
when individuals (subjects of the sovereign) ascribe the highest authority (the 
supreme power) to this sovereign, who can be a person (e.g. a monarch or a 
president), a group of persons (e.g. a government), an imaginary person (e.g. 
God), or an idea (e.g. idea of law).176 On the other hand, the sovereign (e.g. a 
person to whom collective legal consciousness ascribes the highest authority) 
might ascribe to himself certain “sovereign” rights and duties to other 
individuals or groups of persons.177 He might ascribe to other states a duty not 
to interfere with his state’s internal or external affairs (to be more precise, in 
what he considers to be those affairs).178 Hence we have a concept of two aspects 
of sovereignty in the mind of the sovereign: (1) an internal aspect (i.e. an idea 
about the right to the supreme and exclusive authority within a state’s territory), 
and (2) an external aspect (a duty ascribed to other states and persons not to 
interfere into what he considers to be his exclusive competence).179 
These two aspects of sovereignty are sometimes described as negative and 
positive sovereignty.180  
In the terms of the psychological theory, a person who considers himself to 
be a representative of a sovereign state (e.g. a head of the state, prime-minister, 
or a minister of foreign affairs) typically ascribes to his state the following rights 
in international relations: the right to be treated as equal to other states; the right 
of respect from other states and their representatives; and the right not to be 
attacked by military force of the other state.181 On the other hand, he ascribes to 
other states and their representatives the corresponding duties.182 
At the same time, some states’ leaders might ascribe to themselves and to 
their states some rights which do not exist in the eyes of other leaders, which 
might lead to international conflicts.183 For instance, a head of a powerful state 
might ascribe to his state the right to interfere into the affairs of those 
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neighboring states which he considers to be within the sphere of his country’s 
“special” interests.184 
II.  SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTELLECTUAL STRUCTURE 
OF INTERNATIONAL-LEGAL EXPERIENCE 
 In the contemporary international-legal theory subject of international law 
is typically defined as an entity possessing international rights and obligations, 
and having the capacity to: (a) maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims; and (b) to be responsible for its breaches of international legal 
obligations.185 However, as James Crawford notes, this definition, though 
conventional, is circular since, “while the indicia referred to depend in theory on 
the existence of a legal person, the main way of determining whether the relevant 
capacity exists in case of doubt is to inquire whether it is in fact exercised.”186 
The international-legal doctrine is helpless in the face of the need to explain 
the legal nature of such “anomalous” subjects of international law as “belligerent 
communities,” “governments in exile,” the Sovereign Order of Malta, Taiwan, 
etc.187 This helplessness manifests itself in the use of the term “entities sui 
generis,” because legal theorists do not know under which theoretical heading 
to place these entities.188 For example, in the case of civil war in a state, the other 
states might recognize as a legitimate representative of the given state, not its 
government, but an armed opposition (e.g. civil war in Syria). A “government 
in exile” might be recognized as a legitimate representative of state A by state B 
but not by state C. 
Taiwan is officially considered by many states as a part of the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China and at the same time as a separate subject for 
some purposes (e.g. as a “fishing entity” for law of the sea and as separate 
customs territory for the WTO’s membership).189 The Sovereign Order of Malta, 
lacking state territory and population, nevertheless maintains diplomatic 
relations with more than one hundred states.190 
There are also such anomalous entities to which international law ascribes 
certain rights as “the international community as a whole,” “mankind,” and the 
“future generations.”191 
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According to the ICJ, erga omnes obligations are those obligations that a 
state has toward “the international community as a whole.”192 In other words, in 
the minds of the ICJ judges, “the international community” is a psychical 
representation to which they ascribe certain rights.193 Mankind, as another 
psychical representation, in the minds of individuals possesses “heritage.”194 
In international environmental law, the “future generations” which are not 
yet born, have certain rights (e.g., access to the cultural and natural resources 
which the current generation enjoy).195 For instance, the Philippine Supreme 
Court in Manila held that: 
[E]very generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and 
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little 
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment 
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the 
protection of that right for the generations to come.196 
In national law, rights and legal personality can be ascribed even to rivers, 
ecosystems, and nature.197 Traditional legal theory equally stands helpless 
before these anomalous subjects of law, not being able to explain their true 
nature. 
The true legal nature of these “anomalous” entities, for the legal scholars, 
can be explained only by the psychological theory of law. From the standpoint 
of the psychological theory of law, the subject of international law can be 
defined as an object of representations in the human psyche to which a given 
individual ascribes rights and obligations in the field of international relations.198 
As for the concept of international relations, it has to do with the belief (which 
may exist or not in social reality) that the given subjects of international law (e.g. 
states) are in legal relations with one another.199 
For an individual (e.g. international-legal theorist) to whom the primary 
subjects of international law are states, all other subjects of international law 
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might by experienced as those entities which are recognized as subjects by the 
states and who depend upon these states for their “existence.”200 In this psyche, 
states as objects of representation create other subjects of international law or 
“recognize” their existence.201  
Other individuals might ascribe rights and obligations under international 
law directly to various beings.202 There are also individuals who consider the 
international legal community of states as a whole as an authority which 
conferred international legal subjectivity upon various entities.203 
In case of a disagreement about the “existence” of a particular subject of 
international law, the international lawyer often tries to find and refers to the 
corresponding normative fact in order to substantiate his or her position, (e.g., 
he or she might refer to the court’s decision or an international treaty). For 
example, to substantiate the view that an international governmental 
organization (e.g. the UN) is a subject of international law, international lawyers 
refers to the advisory opinion of the ICJ: “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations.”204 
As was mentioned, supra, Hans Kelsen has drawn parallels between the 
concept of state and the concept of juridical person.205 This comparison might 
be helpful for us to explain the true nature of the concept of the subject of 
international law or international-legal person in legal theory. 
From the perspective of the psychological theory of law, most of the 
concepts of juristic persons in the legal scholarship are naïve-realistic because 
those subjects of law (e.g. juristic persons) are naively dealt with as realities 
actually existent, or, on the other hand, these concepts can be “naïve-nihilistic, 
insofar as—failing to find in the external world anything real which seems 
appropriate—they concede the impossibility of finding, and refuse to believe 
that there exist, innumerable subjects of rights (which undoubtedly do exist or 
have previously existed.)”206  
The modern legal science, continues Petrażycki, mistakenly denies the 
“existence (actual or potential) of all those categories of subjects not coming 
under the heading of ‘living people,’ ‘physical persons,’ ‘human organizations,’ 
or ‘juristic persons,’ which (particularly in earlier stages of culture, including 
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the Middle Ages) played an important part in the legal mentality and in official 
law . . . .”207 
Such an attitude of the modern legal theory, which is also characteristic for 
the international-legal theory, is unscientific because it ignores early forms of 
international law. Such as ancient international law (e.g. international law of the 
Sumerian civilization), which was primarily viewed by the ancient mind as law 
between deities standing behind city-states.208 
Petrażycki also states that “the existence of a social organism is not a 
condition precedent to the emergence of juristic person.”209  
Petrażycki criticized naïve-constructivist teachings on the subjects of law, 
which instead of exploring actually existing phenomena in the sphere of their 
real existence (which is human psyche), are building different fantastic creatures 
in the inappropriate spheres (e.g., theories of “social organisms,” theories of 
different kinds of metaphysical “wills,” etc.).210 
It is worth recalling that the Soviet theory of international law viewed its 
essence in “the concordance of the wills of states.”211 
The truly scientific doctrine of subjects of law, according to Petrażycki, can 
be built only when we seek subjects of law in the mind of a person who ascribes 
to these “subjects” rights and obligations and not in some kind of “external 
reality.”212 Petrażycki points out: “As in other fields of legal science, the sphere 
where the relevant phenomena are found and studied is transferred from the 
external world to the mind of the person experiencing legal processes and 
ascribing obligations and rights to various beings . . . .”213  
For example, in the field of international law, rights and obligations are 
ascribed to such phenomena as “future generations,” “mankind,” “national 
minorities,” “indigenous peoples,” “Sovereign Military Order of Malta,” etc.214  
As Petrażycki points out, when jurists ascribe to juristic and physical 
persons certain rights and obligations—when they experience the corresponding 
legal judgment—they actually have the relevant subjects “extremely close at 
hand,” in their minds, where it is very easy to become acquainted with their 
nature.215 Using “the treasury has such and such rights” as an illustration of his 
point, Petrażycki holds that the subject of the right ascribed is the logical subject 
of this judgment—that is conceived of and to which is referred the logical 
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predicate: “has the right;” the content or object of the idea to which the word 
“treasury” corresponds.216 He stresses the point that “treasury” here is 
undoubtedly “the real, logical, and juristic subject.”217 This line of reasoning by 
Petrażycki is applicable to the subjects of international law, which also exist as 
logical and juristic subjects of the judgments. For example, it would be futile to 
look for the “future generations” as a person or thing to which mankind owes 
certain obligations with respect to protection of the environment, in the external 
world, but, nevertheless, “future generations” are real in a sense of being a 
logical and juristic subject. 
Of particular interest to us is the old debate between international-legal 
scholars regarding the question whether a human being is a subject of 
international law. To some scholars, a human being (natural person) is not a 
subject but merely an object of international law.218 To others, individuals are 
“derivative” subjects in that they draw their existence from the formal decisions 
of other subjects, primarily states.219 The third group of scholars sees in 
individuals the only actors and subjects of international law.220 
One of the common mistakes made by the scholars in their assessment of an 
individual as a subject of international law is related to what Petrażycki calls 
“the (mistakenly) realistic doctrine of ‘physical’ subjects of law (‘living human 
individuals’).”221 
The truth is that an individual (human being or natural person) is a subject 
of international law only as a logical or grammatical subject existing in our 
minds (i.e. as a psychical representation) and not as a “living human 
individual.”222 
According to Petrażycki, the intellectual structure of the legal mentality 
(legal psychical experience) comprises of the following elements: 
(1) Object ideas (i.e. psychical representations)—ideas: (a) of objects of 
obligations (of obligatory actions), and (b) of objects of rights (of acquisitions 
which are due and owing); 
(2) Subject ideas—ideas: (a) of subjects of obligations, and (b) of subjects 
of rights; 
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(3) Ideas of relevant legal facts; and 
(4) Ideas of normative facts.223 
This scheme of the intellectual structure of law, which is complete and 
exhaustive, is applicable to international law. This scheme allows us to answer 
the following questions in the field of international legal relations: (1) who is 
bound (who is the subject of the international-legal obligation)?; (2) to what 
action or actions is this subject bound (what is the object of the international 
legal obligation)?; (3) who is the subject of the relevant right?; and (4) to what 
does the subject have a right—what is due to him (the object of the right)? 
Answering these questions helps us to better understand the essence of the 
subjects of international law and their rights and obligations under international 
law.  
A. The Relationship Between International and National Law 
In international-legal theory there are several competing approaches striving 
to explain the relationship between international and national law; in particular, 
trying to answer the question of which rules of law, international or national, 
should take precedence in a case of conflict between these rules.  
The proponents of the dualistic approach claim that international and 
national law are two distinct legal orders, having nothing to do with each 
other.224 These two legal orders have different objects (the subject matter) of 
regulation (i.e., interstate relations in case of international law and intrastate 
relations in case of national law), different subjects (i.e., primarily states and 
international organizations in case of international law and private persons 
[natural and legal persons] in case of national law), and different sources (e.g., 
treaties and customs in international law and, mostly, acts of legislation in case 
of national law).225 The dualistic approach, which seems rather popular among 
international-legal scholars, does not give a direct answer to the question of 
which legal norm, international or national, should be applied in the case of a 
conflict between them. Theoretically assuming that international law and 
national law are two different legal systems regulating different kinds of social 
relations, there cannot be any conflict between them. At the same time, the 
proponents of dualism might argue that in the realm of national law 
international-legal rules can be applied only on the basis of national-legal 
rules—for example, on the basis of the constitutional norms.  
 
 223. Id. at 58–59. 
 224. Andreas L. Paulus, The Emergence of the International Community and the Divide 
Between International and Domestic Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (André Nollkaemper & Janne Elisabeth Nijman eds., 
2007). 
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The monistic approach to the relationship between international and national 
law postulates that both laws constitute one single legal system, something like 
a hierarchically organized pyramid of legal norms.226 The question is only about 
what law (international or national) should be at the apex of this legal pyramid.  
In Kelsen’s legal theory, international and national law are parts of one legal 
system, with primacy belonging to the international-legal rules.227 To Kelsen, in 
this hierarchy of legal norms the lower-level legal norms derive their validity 
from the validity of the higher legal norms, thereby logically leading to a single 
basic norm, which is not real but “hypothetical.”228 What this “basic norm” is 
remains somewhat a mystery, because initially Kelsen put at the top of the legal 
pyramid a general principle of law and one of the fundamental principles of 
international law “pacta sunt servanda,” but later on came up with logically 
circular “basic norm” according to which: “The states ought to behave as they 
have customarily behaved.”229  
In reality, however, for the judges of national courts even in those legal 
systems which are regarded as “monistic,” and in which the primacy in case of 
a conflict between international treaties and national law belongs to the former, 
the part of “the basic norm” is played by constitution.230  
From the psychological perspective, to understand the relationship between 
international and national law we need to look at this issue from two different 
angles: the point of view of an international lawyer (e.g., a judge of an 
international court) and, on the other hand, from the perspective of a national 
lawyer (e.g., a judge of a national court).  
An individual has a natural psychological tendency to build in his mind a 
hierarchy of normative facts. For example, a judge of an international court tends 
to view himself as an organ of international justice or a servant to international 
law. In other words, he is inclined to give primacy to international, rather than 
national law. From his perspective in the case of a conflict between 
international-legal and national-legal rules the priority will belong to 
international-legal rules, especially to such as the UN Charter, basic principles 
of international law, as expressed in such normative facts as the “Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (1970) and 
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the Helsinki Final Act, as well as norms jus cogens and obligations erga 
omnes.231  
To give priority to an international treaty, the judge of an international court 
can refer as to authoritative normative facts to the articles 26 and 27 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, according to which “[e]very treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith” (Art. 26) and the state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”232  
In a word, in the mind of an international lawyer, international-legal facts 
take precedence over national-legal normative facts.  
The picture in the mind of a national lawyer might look differently. For 
instance, to the judge of the national court, the highest authority as a normative 
fact is the national constitution. Unlike the international lawyer, who tends to 
view the international treaty as one normative fact, in the eyes of the national 
judge there are three different normative facts: international inter-state treaties, 
international inter-governmental treaties, and international agreements of inter-
ministerial character.233 In the mind of the national judge the hierarchy between 
international and national normative facts is more complicated and he tends to 
apply international normative facts insofar as it is required by the national 
normative facts.234  
In summary, there is no issue about the relationship between international 
and national law but rather an issue of how to build the hierarchy of international 
and national normative facts; constructing this hierarchy the national and 
international lawyers tend to proceed from different assumptions. The 
international lawyer assumes that the hierarchy of normative facts should be 
built with the preference for international normative facts, whereas the national 
lawyer gives preference to the national normative facts but first of all to national 
constitution.235 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The psychological theory of international law allows us not only to shed new 
light on the most important issues of the international-legal theory and practice, 
which cannot be solved by the traditional theory of international law, but also 
lays the necessary groundwork for the creation of the true science of 
international law. 
The future of international law to a great extent depends on whether or not 
the new science of this law will be built, and this science should be based upon 
three pillars: (1) psychological theory of international law; (2) sociological 
theory of international law; and (3) juridical-dogmatic theory of international 
law. 
To become the science in the true sense of the word, international law should 
jettison those quasi-scientific theories which are rooted in the logical errors as 
to the true nature of law and to use the psychological theory of law’s 
methodology as a reliable instrument of the scientific research. 
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